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INTRODUCTION

It would be an understatement to say that judicial sentencing

discretion is in a state of flux; turmoil is more appropriate. In re
cent years Congress has laid siege to the traditional sentencing dis
cretion of United States federal district court judges. Two recent
enactments highlight Congress' move to restrict the ability of the
federal judiciary to tailor punishments for individual criminals. But
the courts have reacted in this battle, which at its core is a debate
over the proper scope of judicial sentencing discretion. In two high
profile decisions, Blakely v. Washington l and United States v.
Booker,2 the U.S. Supreme Court has resisted legislative action re

* B.A., University of Denver; M.A., California State University, Los Angeles;
J.D., magna cum laude, University of Wisconsin Law School. I would like to thank
Professor Karl Shoemaker for his assistance and, of course, for helping show medieval
law's continued relevance to modern events. I would also like to thank Bratislav
Stankovic and Guillermo Carrillo for their helpful comments on early drafts of this
Article. Of course, any errors that remain are mine.
1. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
2. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
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stricting judicial sentencing discretion. Together, these events have
sparked an important dialogue concerning the scope of federal
judges' ability to mete out sentences.
The most commented on congressional action was the passage
of the Feeney Amendment.3 A number of the Feeney Amend
ment's provisions limit judges' discretion during criminal sentencing
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). Until
Booker, the Guidelines themselves restricted judges' ability to craft
a sentence that truly reflected the facts of each case. The debate
less passage of the Feeney Amendment 4 led to immediate cries that
Congress was impinging on the independence of the judiciary in a
way that was not only imprudent, but also contrary to the funda
mental principles of the Constitution. 5 As Judge Dickran Tevrizian
recently articulated, "judicial independence is the ability of the
courts to be free of inappropriate controls when engaging in judicial
decision making."6
Congress also limited judicial discretion by significantly in
creasing the penalties for white-collar crimes-even though the
body in charge of recommending changes in penalties had just in
creased them following the conclusion of a comprehensive six-year
3.

Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c.

§ 3742(g)(1» [hereinafter Feeney Amendment].

4. Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of
Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 295 (2004)
(calling the Feeney Amendment a "drive-by rewrite of sentencing law"); Bruce Moyer,
FBA Urges Repeal of Sentencing Restrictions, FED. LAW., Feb. 2004, at 10. See also
David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on
Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REv. 211, 229 (2004).
5. See Bruce Moyer, Judges Challenge Congress on Sentencing Authority, FED.
LAW., Oct. 2003, at 10 [hereinafter Judges Challenge Congress]. Moyer discusses the
judicial reaction to the changes in the Guidelines and quotes one district court judge's
reaction:
Judge John S. Martin Jr., writing in The New York Times in June, announced
his intention to resign from the bench and declared, "For a judge to be de
prived of the ability to consider all of the factors that go into formulating a just
sentence is completely at odds with the sentencing philosophy that has been
the hallmark of the American justice system."
Id. See also Michael S. Gerber, A Judge's View, LEGAL AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 74-75.
Despite the title of the piece, Mr. Gerber is not a judge. See The Hill, Beats and Bios, at
http://thehill.comlthehill/exportlTheHilIIAboutimichaet.gerber.html.
6. United States v. Mendoza, No. CR 03-730 DT, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1449, at
*4-5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2004). Mendoza is one of two cases other than Booker to
address the constitutionality of the Feeney Amendment. In Mendoza, the court struck
down the reporting requirements, but did uphold a number of the other provisions of
the Amendment. See generally id. In United States v. Detwiler, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D.
Ore. 2004), the court found the Guidelines, as modified by the Feeney Amendment, to
be an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers. Id. at 1182.
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study.7
Late last term the U.S. Supreme Court, amidst important deci
sions about the Executive Branch's power8 and the Pledge of Alle
giance,9 dropped a bombshell in the world of criminal law when it
issued Blakely. The decision has been called "one of the most, if
not the most, significant constitutional criminal procedure decisions
in generations."l0 Steven L. Chanenson was correct that Blakely
was a significant decision, but he was also correct in his prophetic
description of what was to come: "In fact, as of this writing in early
August 2004, it may be better to think of Blakely as casting a dark
storm cloud over virtually all determinate sentencing guideline sys
tems. Which guidelines get the rain and which do not remains to be
seen."11 On January 12, 2005, after months of speculation as to the
effect Blakely might have on the federal Guidelines, the U.S. Su
preme Court answered that question when it issued Booker.12
In Blakely, the Court examined Washington State's determi
nate sentencing scheme. 13 The scheme allowed judges to impose
sentences beyond the statutory maximum for an offense if certain
criteria were met.1 4 However, facts that could lead to a longer sen
tence did not have to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. I5 The Court invalidated Washington's scheme, saying that
only on the basis of a jury's authorization may a judge impose a
sentence beyond the sentence that was imposed by the legislature
for that crime. I6 To do otherwise violates a defendant's right to a
jury trial under the Sixth AmendmentP
In Booker, the Court examined the Guidelines in light of
Blakely.I8 In an unusual majority opinion, authored in part by Jus
tice Stevens and in part by Justice Breyer, the Court held that while
the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Blakely did apply to the
7. Kirby D. Behre & A. Jeff Ifrah, Grid & Bear It, CHAMPION, Aug. 2003, at 44
[hereinafter Grid & Bear It].
8. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004);
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
9. Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
10. Steven L. Chanenson, Hoist With their Own Petard?, 17 FED. SENT. REP.
(forthcoming Oct. 2004) (manuscript at 3, on file with author).
11. Id. at 4.
12. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
13. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2435 (2004).
14. Id. at 2535.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2536. See also Chanenson, supra note 10, at 1.
17. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540.
18. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005).
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Guidelines, the Guidelines could be saved from nullification by sev
ering certain mandatory provisions.19 The Court therefore upheld
the Guidelines, but essentially de-clawed them by rendering the
Guidelines "advisory."2o While the Guidelines remain an impor
tant factor for judges to consider in sentencing defendants, judges
now have a renewed level of discretion in fashioning punishments
for federal crimes.
Congress' actions and the Blakely and Booker decisions have
reinvigorated the debate over the preferred scope of judicial inde
pendence as most easily measured by discretion. The debate over
the Feeney Amendment, and the Guidelines in general, focuses on
the harshness and inequalities of criminal sentencing at the federal
level. However, the debate is important for another reason: it ex
poses the inherent tensions in the distribution and separation of
power between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of
government.
As noted by Justice Breyer in Booker: "Ours, of course, is not
the last word: The ball now lies in Congress' court. The National
Legislature is equipped to devise and install, long-term, the sen
tencing system, compatible with the Constitution, that Congress
judges best for the federal system of justice."21
The turmoil created by Blakely, Booker, and the Feeney
Amendment provides a perfect opportunity to step back and re
examine judicial discretion and the mechanisms that operate to
constrain judges' behavior. This Article is such an undertaking.
More specifically, this Article will look at the very birth of the
Common Law in medieval England between 1066 and 1215 for les
sons that will help us better understand the optimal scope of judi
cial discretion, as well as the possible implications of Congressional
action to define sentencing discretion.
Certain commonalities emerge when we reduce the two legal
systems' treatment of judicial discretion to a few key principles. I
will show that both the medieval English monarchy and our current
democracy struggled with defining the desirable scope of judicial
discretion. The result is that in both systems there have been spe
cific, reactionary limitations on discretion, as well as the implemen
tation of more structural limitations on judicial discretion. Many of
19. Id.
20. Id. at 757, 767; United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 911 (D. Utah
2005) ("In light of the Supreme Court's holding [in Booker], this court must now con
sider just how 'advisory' the Guidelines are.").
21. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 768.
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the discretion-limiting structural mechanisms developed in medie
val England between 1066 and 1215 remain an important part of
the current U.S. federal legal system. Finally, I will show that in
addition to having a general distrust of the judiciary, both the cur
rent Congress and medieval English kings show similar reactions to
legal turmoil.
Part I provides an overview of judicial discretion under the cur
rent U.S. federal system by looking first at the inherent structural
limitations on judicial discretion. In some cases, structural limita
tions operate to impact judicial discretion more than spot legisla
tion passed by Congress. 22 Part I then turns to a discussion of the
controversy surrounding the federal sentencing guidelines. Here, I
distill the current controversy over the Guidelines and inherent
structural limitations down to a few key principles, and in doing so,
afford the best opportunity to compare similarly extracted princi
ples from medieval England's legal system.
Part II endeavors to uncover the scope of judicial discretion in
medieval England between 1066 and 1215.23 This Part discusses
specific examples as a way of illustrating the broader principles and
discretion-limiting mechanisms operating during that tumultuous
period.
Part III directly compares the principles that emerge from the
previous two sections. This Article will show that despite the differ
ences-sometimes significant-between medieval England and the
current U.S. federal system, important and valuable similarities are
gleaned. The similarities highlight important lessons that will in
form the current debate over the future and nature of the Guide
lines and the proper scope of federal judges' discretion.
22. An analogy would be the rules in soccer and how they affect the decision
making of the players. The rules of play, enforced by the referee, operate to restrict
players' decision-making in an obvious way. As the referee takes action by selectively
enforcing rules based on the particular facts of the situation, players' behavior is af
fected. In one game a referee may not call any off-sides penalties, even though the rule
is always there. In another game, off-sides might be strictly enforced. In contrast, there
are "structural limitations" inherent in a soccer game. All players in a given league will
have their decision-making equally affected by such structural limitations as the length
and width of the field, or the height and width of the goal. In the United States federal
system, Congress creates spot-legislation or cracks down on non-enforcement of previ
ous legislation. This occurs against a series of structural limitations that have existed in
our judicial system since its creation in the eighteenth century.
23. England is the particular focus for a number of reasons. First, it is the legal
system from whence the American legal system sprang. Second, there would be en
tirely too much material, over too great a time, if there were not some limits.
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LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL DISCRETION UNDER THE
CURRENT U.S. FEDERAL SYSTEM

"Judicial discretion" is a buzz-phrase that defies simple defini
tion. But to borrow an accepted characterization: judicial discre
tion is either primary or secondary in nature. 24 A judge's primary
discretion occurs when he or she chooses from amongst a range of
choices. 25 It is in this area that "the court can do no wrong, legally
speaking, for there is no officially right or wrong answer."26 Pri
mary discretion can be limited in two ·ways. First, Congress can
limit primary judicial discretion through specific enactments, which
reduce a judge's range of choices through explicit language. As will
be discussed below, the Feeney Amendment modifying portions of
the Guidelines is such a limitation.27 The Guidelines themselves,
although promulgated through a quasi-legislative Commission,28
also embody Congress' desire to target a specific area for the reduc
tion of judicial discretion. Another way primary discretion can be
limited is through structural mechanisms, which act in a less obvi
ous way to reduce the range of choices available to a judge. For
example, the long-term trend to codify legal doctrines and the role
of juries are structural mechanisms that operate to limit primary
judicial discretion.
In contrast, secondary discretion deals with the relationship be
tween judges. 29 The most not~ble limitation on this type of discre
tion is appellate review, and it is therefore almost exclusively a
limitation visited on trial court judges.30 This Article addresses
both types of discretion primarily as they operate at the federal trial
court level.
A.

Structural Limitations on Judicial Discretion in the Current
U.S. Federal System

A variety of structural mechanisms limit the discretion of fed
eral trial court judges: the long-term trend to codify laws, the jury,
24. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from
Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 637 (1971).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See infra notes 59-80 and accompanying text.
28. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 765 (2005) ("[T]he Commission
[does] not exercise judicial authority, but [is] more properly thought of as exercising
some sort of legislative power ....").
29. Rosenberg, supra note 24, at 637-38.
30. Id.
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appellate review,31 and jurisdiction.
1.

Codification

Each year Congress creates scores of new statutes. While
sometimes the statutes merely clarify already existing statutes or
rules, at times the statutes also take an area of law from the com
mon law and move it into code-based law. Under a common law
system, the judge "makes the law" and a particular legal doctrine
can change and grow as courts interpret the law in light of the facts
of each new case. It is possible under the U.S. federal system con
sisting of twelve circuit courts of appeals with attendant trial courts
(district courts) that until the highest level of appellate review, the
U.S. Supreme Court, addresses a particular issue, twelve (or more)
different ways of handling a legal issue might co-exist within the
federal system. The circuit courts' respective interpretations of a
legal doctrine might develop at disparate rates and in slightly differ
ent directions.
Congress sometimes steps in to reduce judicial discretion when
a legal doctrine is slow to develop or develops in a way that draws
the attention of the other government branches. Thus, the codifica
tion of a particular area of law will create uniformity in federal law.
One notable example of this is the Federal Tort Claims Act
("FTCA").32 Tort law is traditionally one of the great common law
areas; famous tort cases fill casebooks at most law schools. When
the FTCA was enacted, specifically enumerated legal standards cur
tailed federal judges' primary discretion by limiting the types and
number of choices judges could make when hearing a tort claim.
As Congress continues to codify legal doctrines at an ever-increas
ing rate, it further reduces the substantive areas in which a judge
may act with significant discretion.
2.

The Jury

Juries are another limit on primary judicial discretion. Histori
cally, juries operate as one of the most significant limitations on
judicial discretion by taking fact-finding out of the hands of
judges. 33 The jury is a cornerstone of the U.S. legal system. Not
31. Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of
Managerial Judging, 29 u.c. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 56-58 (1995).
32. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (codified at 28 U.S.c.
§§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (2000» (authorizing common-law tort claims against the United
States).
33. Peterson, supra note 31, at 58.
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only does the Seventh Amendment guarantee the right to trial by
jury,34 but the first Congress also sought to protect the role of com
mon law juries.35 With juries assuming that role of fact-finder,
judges are "relegated" to making decisions about the law and legal
standards. 36 The limitation on discretion is even more pronounced
when the presence of a jury is coupled with a cause of action codi
fied by Congress.
There is, however, a caveat to the proposition that juries in the
federal system act as a significant discretion-limiting mechanism:
juries are less prevalent today than they were in eighteenth and
nineteenth century America. 37 One must therefore be cautious not
to overstate the jury's role in curtailing primary judicial discretion.
Furthermore, as federal judges' caseloads have increased, it has be
come more difficult to get a civil case scheduled for a jury trial.
Criminal defendants are guaranteed a "speedy trial,"38 but civil
litigants are not. As a result, many parties to civil litigation waive
their right to a jury trial in order to expedite their claim. Even with
the right to a speedy trial, juries do not decide the outcome in most
criminal prosecutions. 39 In criminal cases, eighty-six percent of de
fendants plead guilty and ten percent have their cases dismissed. 40
Of the remaining four percent, juries decide only some, because de
fendants can waive their right to a jury trial.
At the time of the framing of the Constitution, the right to a
trial by jury operated as a significant check on judicial discretion by
taking away from the judge any fact-finding role. In theory, this cut
the judiciary's scope of discretion in half. As the role of the jury
34. u.S. CONST. amend. VII. This amendment provides that
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than accord
ing to the rules of the common law.

Id.
35. Peterson, supra note 31, at 59 ("The Judiciary Act of 1789 expressly limited
equity jurisdiction ... so as to preserve a common law right to a jury trial.").
36. I use "relegated" because, in theory, this is still a significant discretionary role.
37. In fact, they are becoming rarer. Gina Holland, Sharp Decline in Jury Trials
Poses Dilemma for Lawyers, ALBANY DEMOCRAT-HERALD, Aug. 7, 2004, available at
http://democratherald.com!artic1es/2004/08/08/news/nationln at.13.txt.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
39. Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 14 n.82 (2004) ("[I]n 2003, only 4 percent of defendants in federal
criminal cases went to trial ....") (citation omitted).
40. LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES, tbl. 3.5 (Mar. 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/judicialfactsfigures/table3.05.pdf.
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diminishes, it is no longer clear how much primary judicial discre
tion is limited as a result.
3.

Appellate Review

The appellate process operates as a check on judicial discretion
by subjecting trial courts to review. In the United States federal
judicial system, either party has the right to appeal a trial court's
ruling or decision to the federal court of appeals. In turn, a party
can request review by the U.S. Supreme Court. 41
Within the check of appellate review there is another mecha
nism operating to limit (or expand) judicial discretion: the standard
of review under which the appellate court examines a judge's ruling
at the trial court leve1. 42 As the standard of review becomes more
deferential ("abuse of discretion" or "clearly erroneous"), judges
are said to have more discretion, because they know it is unlikely an
appellate court will overturn their rulings. A less deferential stan
dard occurs when a ruling is reviewed de novo by an appellate
court. Under de novo review, a trial court effectively has very little
secondary discretion because, on review, the appellate court will
step in the place of a trial court and look at an issue anew.
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court hears very few cases, the
abstract legal principles it announces operate, along with the doc
trine of stare decisis ,43 as a check on district court and court of ap
peals judges alike. When the Framers crafted the Constitution, and
Congress later added courts,44 there was a conscious attempt to
limit the amount of discretion or power that might fall in the hands
of any single individual. That fear extended to the judiciary.
Therefore, appellate review became the ultimate check on individ
ual trial judges' discretion. Justice Jackson best summed up the im
portance of appellate review: "We [the U.S. Supreme Court] are
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only be
41. However, because the U.S. Supreme Court grants petitions for review so in
frequently, it is largely the twelve courts of appeals that act as limitations on judges'
secondary discretion.
42. "Standard of Review" is the lens through which an appellate court looks at
the decision and reasoning of the court below. It is, therefore, a very powerful mecha
nism for determining the outcome of a case once it has been appealed.
43. Stare decisis is defined as: "The doctrine of precedent, under which it is nec
essary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in
litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999).
44. U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 1 (noting "such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish").
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cause we are final."45 The design of the federal courts acts as a
structural mechanism to limit the amount of secondary, as well as
primary, federal judicial discretion.
4.

Jurisdiction

The most significant check on federal judicial discretion
emerges from the Constitution and cases such as Erie v.
Tompkins. 46 While Chief Justice John Marshall may have suc
ceeded in one of the great power grabs in U.S. history in Marbury v.
Madison,47 the Constitution still significantly constrains primary
judicial discretion by limiting judicial power to "cases or
controversies."48
Additionally, Congress has created a number of specialty
courts, such as the Court of Federal Claims, that remove entire ar
eas of law from the hands of a large portion of the federal judiciary.
The House of Representatives passage of The Marriage Protection
Act provides a perfect example. 49 This bill would remove questions
regarding gay marriage and questions arising from the Defense of
Marriage Act from the jurisdiction of the federal courts.50 While
the constitutionality of this bill is questionable, it nevertheless illus
trates that Congress can, and does, attempt to impact judicial dis
cretion by tinkering with the jurisdiction of federal courts.
In turn, each of the above-mentioned changes limits judges'
primary or secondary discretion.
5.

Grants of Discretion

The U.S. federal system is unique however, not because of its
structural limitations on judicial discretion, but rather because of
the mechanisms that operate to ensure it. The framers of the U.S.
Constitution wanted an independent federal judiciary (their con
cerns about consolidation of power notwithstanding).51 In fact, the
federal judiciary is subject to less external checks than any other
45. Peterson, supra note 31, at 56 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540
(1953), overruled by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)).
46. 304 U.S. 64 (1938), superceded by 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2004).
47. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution [and] ... to Controversies.").
49. Marriage Protection Act, H.R. 3313EH, 108th Congo (2004). It is, of course,
extremely unlikely that such a bill would ever pass the Senate.
50. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
51. Peterson, supra note 31, at 45.
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branch of the government. 52
Clauses contained in Article III of the United States Constitu
tion guarantee tenure during good behavior53 and protect federal
judges' salaries from being reduced during their time on the
bench. 54 Federal district and appellate court judges are appointed
for life terms, thereby acting as another important mechanism in
ensuring judicial discretion. 55 Federal trial court judges also retain
significant discretion in pre-trial matters. 56 The Federal Rules of
Evidence and the jury, during trial, significantly limit discretion,
whereas prior to trial, judges have significant latitude in handling
parties. This is especially true in civil trials, as most pre-trial deci
sions are not subject to judicial review by federal appellate courtsY
Judges also wield powerful discretion in fashioning settlements in
the ever-growing field of class action and mass-tort lawsuits. 58
From this brief and non-exhaustive overview of judicial discre
tion in the U.S. federal system, several principles emerge. First,
U.S. federal trial judges still retain a fair amount of both primary
and secondary judicial discretion in a number of areas of law and
trial procedure. Second, Congress has acted, and will continue to
act, to limit primary judicial discretion where it can, often as knee
jerk reactions to public or political outcry. Finally, significant struc
tural mechanisms operate to limit the exercise of judicial discretion.
As will be further discussed below, many of the limitations dis
cussed in this Part are not new, and in fact remain important for
many of the same reasons that motivated their development in me
dieval England.

52. Id.
53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges ... shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour. ").
54. Id. ("[CJompensation ... shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office. ").
55. Counter-acting against lifetime appointment is the increased politization of
the confirmation process. The Senate will confirm only those judges whom the Execu
tive Branch truly supports. As a result, those judges may feel beholden to an Adminis
tration in a way they would not have been when just legal qualifications determined
whether someone was confirmed.
56. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1561, 1587-93 (2003).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1601-04.
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Recent Developments Concerning the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines
1. The Feeney59 Amendment and the Guidelines

Congress' passage of the Feeney Amendment reinvigorated
the debate over how much discretion federal judges should have,
particularly in those areas traditionally the sole province of the judi
ciary, such as criminal sentencing. The Feeney Amendment, which
was tacked on without debate to the "Amber Alert" measure in a
last minute move was an overt move by Congress to restrict judicial
discretion. 60
The amendment effectively overruled a 1996 United States Su
preme Court case, Koon v. United States,61 by forbidding judges
from "departing downward"62 from the federal sentencing Guide
lines. 63 Most ironic about the cries that judicial discretion was out
of control, as evidenced by the number of downward departures,
59. The author of the bill was freshman Florida Congressman Tom Feeney.
Feeney was recently quoted as saying about himself: "I am here to say that I think Tom
Feeney knows more about the Constitution than some of our federal judges." Scott
Maxwell, Hanging with the Chief Justice, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 6, 2004, at B2.
Feeney is also currently pushing the "Reaffirmation of American Independence
Resolution" which would forbid judges from relying on foreign case law when deciding
cases. Id. Presumably, this would also undermine Justice Scalia's use of English
Common Law precedent in both Blakely and Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354,
1355-56 (2004) (tracing the historical roots of the right to confront your accuser in his
reinvigoration of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause).
60. Bruce Moyer, New Sentencing Law Narrows Judicial Discretion, FED. LAW.,
May 2003, at 12 [hereinafter New Sentencing Law]. The Amber Alert legislation is an
anti-child pornography and abduction measure. For an excellent history of the Amend
ment and the Amber Alert legislation as recounted in the context of a legal case, see
United States v. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1322 (D. Utah 2003) (finding that the
Amendment allows for discretion in some areas, but that in certain areas judges are
completely restrained).
61. New Sentencing Law, supra note 60, at 12; see also Koon v. United States, 518
U.S. 81, 99 (1996) (judge's downward departure was reviewed under an "abuse of dis
cretion" standard and it was appropriate to consider reasons not contemplated by the
Guidelines when deciding whether to allow a downward departure).
62. "Departing downward" refers to the practice by federal judges of finding this
correct square on the sentencing grid, determining the mandated sentence-say, for
example, twenty months-but then disregarding that specifically mandated term and
giving something lower-say, nineteen months. The downward departure could be for
any number of reasons, including: significant aid to officials in locating other criminals,
the defendant's small role in the crime, his or her willingness to plea bargain, or, a
feeling by the judge that the person would not be better served from the mandatory
time in custody. Of course, judges could depart upwards as well, but this was a far less
common occurrence since it raised Eighth Amendment and due process issues.
63. New Sentencing Law, supra note 60, at 12. While the amendment was origi
nally written to apply to all criminal sentencing, it was subsequently limited to just ap
ply to child pornography and abduction cases. Id.
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was the fact that federal prosecutors themselves account for more
than two-thirds of all requested and granted departures.64 The
amendment was a direct reaction to a federal district court judge's
high-profile comments challenging the efficacy of the Guidelines as
they applied to crack cocaine convictions. 65
The Guidelines have been controversial since their creation as
part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA").66 With the
SRA, Congress created a uniform system with the stated goal of
consistency in federal criminal sentencing. 67 The SRA established
the U.S. Sentencing Commission ("Commission")68 and tasked it
with creating a set of guidelines or grid that would circumscribe the
length of sentence for those convicted of a federal crime. 69 The
Guidelines allowed for either upward or downward "departure" if
the facts of a particular case call for it. Even with discretionary
wiggle room for judges, this system was significantly different than
the previous sentencing practice, where judges were given vast lee
way in determining the length of sentences. 70
64. Mark Allenbaugh, Fighting the Feeney Fear Factor: The Federal Courts Strike
Back, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 46 (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMIS
SION, 108TH CONG., DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES 68 (Comm. Print 2003».
65. Douglas A. Kelley, Federal Judge Draws Congressional Ire, BENCH & B.
MINN., July 2003, at 22 (discussing the comments by Chief Judge James Rosenbaum
when he testified before the House Judiciary Committee in 2002).
66. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, PUb. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 3551-3559,3561-3566,3571-3574,3581-3586,3591-3596, and 28
U.S.c. §§ 991-998 (1994».
67. Kirby D. Behre & A. Jeff Ifrah, You Be The Judge: The Success of Fifteen
Years of Sentencing Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 5, 5 (2003).
68. The Commission is technically legislative, but it was created within the Judi
cial Branch. However, the Feeney Amendment's removal of judges from the Commis
sion calls into serious question this distinction. Chanenson, supra note 10, at 3.
As the central premise of his forthcoming article, Chanenson suggests that by re
moving federal judges from the Commission, Congress inadvertently removed the only
meaningful distinction between the now-invalid Washington sentencing scheme, and the
Guidelines. Id. This is an interesting pOint, and it will be interesting to see what ulti
mately happens, but I think perhaps it is a distinction without a difference. Whether or
not the actual sentences drawn on the grid were conjured up by a panel-authorized by
Congress-or Congress itself, the problem remains the same: should judges be allowed
to exceed the relevant statutory maximum for a crime without authorization from a
jury?
69. See id.; Zlotnick, supra note 4, at 215-25.
70. See Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge's Perspec
tive-2002, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 11,12-14 (2003). Specifically:
The statute defining a particular crime prescribed the maximum, but not any
minimum, sentence. Before sentencing, the court's probation officer inter
viewed the defendant and independently investigated his or her personal his
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By themselves, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, when
mandatory pre-Booker, operated as a significant limitation on pri
mary judicial discretion by limiting judges to a range of possible
sentences, rather than just setting a maximum penalty.71 The Fee
ney Amendment further restricted this already limited primary dis
cretion even further by restricting the sentences judges can give in
certain types of cases.72 As is discussed below, the mandatory pro
visions of the Guidelines were severed in Booker in order to save
them from being unconstitutional in light of Blakely and Apprendi
v. New Jersey.7 3
The Feeney Amendment also attempted to limit a judge's sec
ondary discretion by altering the standard of review for criminal
sentences from "abuse of discretion" to "de novo."74 This provision
was severed from the Guidelines in Justice Breyer's portion of the
majority opinion in Booker.75
A provision of the Feeney Amendment that did survive
Booker allows for tracking of an individual judge's sentencing prac
tices through the issuance of a subpoena.76 Congress makes the de
cision of whom to track on a judge-by-judge basis.77 This
tory, education, work experience, prospects, physical and mental condition,
and criminal record if there was one. From this information, the probation
officer prepared a pre-sentence report. The report also included whatever in
formation the probation officer could gather informally about the sentences
actually imposed for similar crimes by other judges on the same court and
nationwide. The sentencing itself was a serious and solemn ceremony. In a
procedure known as allocution, defense counsel stated his client's case for le
niency, including family background, family and community support, educa
tion or lack of it, and good works such as military service. The prosecution
sometimes, but not always, responded with its perspective on the crime and its
significance. Eyeball-to-eyeball with the judge, the defendant stood and
spoke. Then the judge, exercising his constitutional judicial power, imposed a
sentence.
[d. at 14.
71. The guidelines were originally suggested by a federal judge, but are now an
example of unintended consequences. While Judge Frankel, who originally suggested
them, saw them as a stop-gap measure that would eventually be replaced by appellate
decisions (including the U.S. Supreme Court), the exact opposite has happened. The
guidelines have become more entrenched. Id. at 15.
72. Mark H. Allenbaugh, Who's Afraid of the Federal Judiciary? Why Congress'
Fear of Judicial Sentencing Discretion May Undermine a Generation of Reform, CHAM
PION, June 2003, at 8 [hereinafter Who's Afraid].
73. 530 U.S. 466 (2000), cited in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 763-65
(2005).
74. Who's Afraid, supra note 72, at 11; Bibas, supra note 4, at 296.
75. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 763-65.
76. Bibas, supra note 4, at 308 n.39.
77. Id.
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provision's potential for limiting primary discretion has not gone
unnoticed, as evidenced by Chief Justice William Rehnquist's com
ments on the issue: "There can ... be no doubt that the subject
matter of the questions, and whether they target the judicial deci
sions of individual federal judges, could amount to an unwarranted
and ill-considered effort to intimidate individual judges in the per
formance of their judicial duties."78 Tracking by subpoena allows
Congress to stand just behind a judge, looking over his or her shoul
der and acting as a constant reminder of its presence. This has not
gone unnoticed by members of the federal judiciary.79
In another structural change, the Feeney Amendment changes
the make-up of the Commission so as to no longer require that any
of its members be federal judges-a move in stark contrast to tradi
tional makeup of the Commission, as well as the previously unfet
tered discretion federal judges wielded in criminal sentencing. 80 A
re-constituted Commission without any federal district court judges
could likely end up limiting judges' primary and secondary
discretion.
2.

Sentences for White-Collar Crime

Although the Feeney Amendment garnered the most attention
for its discretion limiting nature, it was not the only congressional
action in 2003 that restrained the sentencing discretion of the fed
eral judiciary. In November 2003, a new set of amendments to the
Guidelines was put in place; these amendments greatly increase the
penalties for white-collar crimes such as fraud and theft. 81 These
amendments are a damaging attack on judicial discretion. It is not
apparent that Booker will have any effect on these amendments to
the Guidelines.
Normally, the Commission is tasked with making recommen
dations for changes in the sentencing grid; with respect to white
collar crimes, it did just that. 82 In the fall of 2002, the Commission
completed a six-year study and concluded that changes needed to
78. Judges Challenge Congress, supra note 5, at 10.
79. United States v. Kim, 313 F. Supp. 2d 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Mark H.
Allenbaugh, Heatwole: A Test Case for Sentencing Sanity, 18 CRIM. JUST. 28, 29 (2004);
but see Gerber, supra note 5, at 74-75.
80. See generally United States v. Detwiler, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Ore. 2004)
(finding that the Feeney Amendment's changes to the Commission violated the Separa
tion of Powers Doctrine).
81. Grid & Bear It, supra note 7, at 44.
82. Id.
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be made to the grid by enhancing penalties for certain white-collar
crimes. 83 However, just seven months after the study and recom
mendations, Congress, reacting to the Enron and World Com scan
dals, suggested, without ever studying the issue, that even harsher
penalties than the Commission's six-year study suggested were nec
essary.84 This has led to outlandish results already.85
While the Commission could have ignored the recommenda
tions, it bent under significant political pressure and adopted
them. 86 As one commentator noted, "[a]s an independent agency
of the Judiciary Branch . . . the Commission must do more than
reflexively adopt the recommendations of the Executive and Legis
lative Branches. "87 If Congress continues to flex its muscle in this
knee-jerk manner, structural mechanisms that protect judicial dis
cretion will be eroded.
The recent changes to the Guidelines highlight Congress' de
sire to reign in the federal judiciary by reducing the federal judges'
primary discretion, and to a lesser extent, secondary discretion.
Congressional action in response to the crisis de jure requires atten
tion, but it is important to note that identifying inherent structural
limitations is just as critical for understanding the scope of judicial
discretion. Even though structural limitations do not draw as much
attention, they often operate to do more to limit judicial discretion
than congressional reactions. 88
Congress' desire to limit judicial discretion is not new. The
roots of these structural limitations and the strong desire to take
specific action to limit judicial discretion can be traced to medieval
England. Therefore, to truly understand the impact of Congress'
current actions and reactions, we must travel back in time to the
birth of the Common Law.
83. [d.
84. [d. at 44-45; Thomas Lee Hazon, Securities Law for Non-Securities Lawyers:
Overview of Federal Securities Law, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, at 6 (2004) ("The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the Congressional reaction (overreaction?) to scandals
such as Enron and Worldcom.").
85. John Gibeaut, Do the Crime, Serve More Time, 3 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 13
(2004) (discussing the twenty-four year and four month sentence for a young mid-level
accountant at Dynegy, Inc. who was described as "essentially nobody" in a stock fraud
scandal).
86. Grid & Bear It, supra note 7, at 45.
87. [d.
88. Of course, a prolonged period of constant enactments by Congress would
have a cumulative effect akin to a structural mechanism, but that discussion is beyond
the limited scope of this Article.
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Blakely v. Washington

The "effect" of today's decision will be greater judicial discretion
and less uniformity in sentencing. 89-Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor simply assumes that the net effect will favor
judges, but she has no empirical basis for that prediction. 9 0-Jus
tice Scalia

Regardless of which Justice is ultimately proven correct, the
immediate "effect" is clear: sentencing discretion is a hot topic. In
fact, the decision has spawned web logs ("blogs") and whole
webpages devoted to Blakely and sentencing resources. 91
While Blakely was confined to examination of Washington
State's determinate sentencing scheme, the implications of Blakely
were immediately apparent: what effect would Blakely have on
whether the Guidelines were valid?92 The U.S. Supreme Court
quickly granted certiorari in two of the early cases that invalidated
either part, or all, of the Guidelines as they pertain to factors that
increase sentences without authorization from a jury.93
Ralph Blakely pled guilty to kidnapping. 94 The statutory maxi
mum for the crime was fifty-three months. 95 However, the judge
felt Blakely had displayed "deliberate cruelty" and imposed a
89. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissent
ing). According to Justice O'Connor:
Sentencing judges ... had virtually unfettered discretion to sentence defend
ants to prison terms falling anywhere within the statutory range . . . . This
system of unguided discretion inevitably resulted in severe disparities in
sentences received and served by defendants committing the same offense and
having similar criminal histories.
Id. at 2544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 2541.
91. The single best resource for Blakely information has to be the blog Sentencing
Law and Policy, operated by Ohio State University law professor Douglas A. Berman,
available at http://sentencing.typepad.com; see also First District Appellate Project,
Blakely v. Washington Resources, available at http://www.fdap.orglblakely.html.
92. Dale Emch, Federal Sentence Guidelines Are Up in Air after Decisions, To
LEDO BLADE, July 18, 2004; Dan Laidman, O'Connor Criticizes Court Decision, MONT
GOMERY HERALD, July 23, 2004 (O'Connor called the Blakely decision a "number 10
earthquake"); David Savage, Thousands of Cases in Doubt After Decision on Sentenc
ing, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2004; Eric Weslander, Congress May Look to Kansas for Sen
tencing Guidance, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-WORLD, July 18, 2004.
93. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed,
73 U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. July 21, 2004) (No. 04-104); United States v. Fanfan, 2004 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 18593 (D. Me. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 73 U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. July 21,
2004) (No. 04-105).
94. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2533.
95. Id. at 2535.
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ninety-month sentence. 96 Even though the judge was allowed to do
this under Washington law, the Court invalidated the procedure.
The Court in Blakely said that Washington's determinate sen
tencing schemes were the "statutory maximums" that a judge could
not exceed without a jury's authorization. 97 It does not matter that
it was the legislature that granted the judge the right to ratchet-up
the penalty; a jury must establish all factors that determine the sen
tence for a criminal defendant. 98

4.

United States v. Booker

In Booker, the Court picked up where it left off in Blakely.
The majority opinion in Booker is divided into two parts. The first
portion, which upholds Apprendi 99 and applies Blakely'S interpreta
tion of the Sixth Amendment to the Guidelines, is authored by Jus
tice Stevens and joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsberg. lOo The second portion of the majority opinion is au
thored by Justice Breyer and is joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsberg. This portion
"saves" the Guidelines from being unconstitutional by severing the
mandatory portions of the Guidelines and the Feeney Amend
ment.I 01 Justices Scalia, Souter, and Thomas all issued solo opin
ions dissenting in part, while Justice Stevens also authored a partial
dissent that Justices Scalia and Souter joined. 102
The first portion of the Booker opinion was not surprising in
light of Apprendi and Blakely. As Justice Stevens noted:
Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Apprendi: Any fact
(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts estab
lished by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by
the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 103

Because the Guidelines required federal judges to move around
(and up) on the sentencing grid based on facts not proved to a jury,
the Guidelines were unconstitutional. If Justice Steven's portion of
96.
97.
98.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Chanenson, supra note 10, at 3-4.
Id. at 2.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 745 (2005).
[d. at 756.
See generally id. at 738.
Id. at 756.
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the majority opinion were the end of the analysis, the Guidelines
would fall.
However, the second portion of the majority opinion severs the
mandatory provisions of the Guidelines in order to save the whole
sentencing scheme from being declared unconstitutional.1 04 This is
the portion of the opinion that renders the previously mandatory
Guidelines advisory.1 05 It is this second portion of the opinion that
will no doubt garner the most attention from commentators and,
more importantly, Congress.
Justice Breyer's portion of the majority opinion in Booker ex
amines two primary options for "saving" the Guidelines from being
declared unconstitutional. One option, which Justices Stevens, Sou
ter, and Scalia advocate in a partial dissent, would engraft a Sixth
Amendment jury trial requirement onto the Guidelines.1 06 Justice
Breyer's majority rejects this: "The addition would change the
Guidelines by preventing the sentencing court from increasing a
sentence on the basis of a fact that the jury did not find (or that the
offender did not admit)."107
Instead, the Court adopted the second option which, through
severance of the offending provisions, "make[s] the Guidelines sys
tem advisory while maintaining a strong connection between the
sentence imposed and the offender's real conduct-a connection
important to the increased uniformity of sentencing that Congress
intended its Guidelines system to achieve."lo8
The majority justified the severance of the mandatory provi
sions of the Guidelines by noting that
We do not doubt that Congress, when it wrote the Sentencing
Act, intended to create a form of mandatory Guidelines system
.... But, we repeat, given today's constitutional holding, that is
not a choice that remains open. Hence, we have examined the
statute in depth to determine Congress' likely intent in light of
today's holding. 109

Justice Scalia responded: "The majority's remedial choice is
thus wonderfully ironic: In order to rescue from nullification a stat
utory scheme designed to eliminate discretionary sentencing, [the
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
See United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 911 (D. Utah 2005).
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756.
Id.
[d.
Id. at 767-68.
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majority] discards the provisions that eliminate discretionary sen
tencing."llo Justice Scalia's point is well-taken, because by choos
ing to render the Guidelines advisory, the majority may have taken
a path that is sure to bring congressional reaction. Had the major
ity chosen to engraft the Sixth Amendment jury trial protections
onto the Guidelines, the ability of Congress to react may have been
significantly reduced.
A federal jury in Wisconsin convicted Freddie Booker of pos
sessing 92.5 grams of crack cocaine. 111 This offense carried a prison
term of ten years to life.n 2 Under the Guidelines, Booker's crimi
nal history and the jury's finding required the district court judge to
select a "base" sentence between 210 months and 262 months.1 13
However, in post-trial sentencing the district court judge found by a
preponderance of the evidence that Booker possessed an additional
566 grams of crack cocaine and also obstructed justice.1 14 These
findings moved Booker's sentencing range under the Guidelines
upward to 360 months to life.1l 5 As the Court noted, this increased
Booker's maximum exposure under the Guidelines beyond twenty
one years, ten months to the thirty-year sentence that the district
court judge ultimately imposed. 116 In light of the Court's first por
tion of the majority opinion applying Apprendi and the Sixth
Amendment analysis of Blakely to the Guidelines, the Court af
firmed the Seventh Circuit's decision in Booker.1l7
Federal criminal defendants and their attorneys should under
standably be pleased with Booker if they thought the Guidelines'
sentences were too harsh and if they thought that judges might
show them some mercy with their new-found sentencing discretion.
110.

Id. at 790 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 745. Booker is a consolidated appeal with United States v. Fanfan.
Duncan Fanfan was similarly convicted of drug offenses. However, the district court in
Fanfan opted not to follow those portions of the Guidelines that implicated Sixth
Amendment concerns, instead sentencing the defendant "based solely upon the guilty
verdict" and not the sentence-enhancement factors. Id. at 747. In Booker, the U.S.
Court of Appeais for the Seventh Circuit invalidated the portion of the sentence that
was contrary to the Court's holding in Apprendi. Id. at 745. In Fanfan, the case by
passed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit when the Court granted the
government's writ of certiorari. Id. at 747.
112. Id. at 745.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 769. However, the Court vacated the sentence in Fanfan and re
manded for potential re-sentencing in light of the Booker opinion. Id.
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Any rejoicing, however, may be premature. For example, at least
one district court has considered the advisory nature of the Guide
lines and imposed a sentence with its newfound discretion that was
within the range the Guidelines mandated.1 18
The other reason celebration may be premature is that Booker
is sure to provoke a response from Congress. After all, in restoring
some sense of judicial discretion to federal sentencing, Justice
Breyer's portion of the majority opinion has effectively neutered
the Guidelines. All that is yet to be determined is the measure of
Congress' response. But irrespective of the form of the inevitable
reaction, for the purpose of this Article, the point is simple: before
Congress119 rushes to react to a functional invalidation of the fed
eral determinate sentencing scheme, or before Congress acts to
shore up the still-valid portions of the Guidelines, it is important to
think about the relevant historical roots of judicial discretion. It is
likewise equally important to look back and examine the impact of
measures designed to limit judicial discretion. Only through revisit
ing the past will Congress be able to craft a constitutional set of
Guidelines that properly balance its desires with the valuable sen
tencing experience many federal judges bring to the process.
II.

JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND

Given England's connection to the U.S., it is logical to limit the
scope of this inquiry to medieval England. However, picking a spe
cific period is the more difficult task. The simplest comparison
would be to pick the time period after which the English common
law legal system was firmly established, between the sixteenth to
eighteenth centuries. However, I have chosen the period between
the invasion by Norman Duke William in 1066 and the offering of
the Magna Carta in 1215 as the most informative for understanding
the implications of Congress' current actions.
The years immediately following the Norman Conquest were a
tumultuous period that turned out to be the inception of what we
recognize as the modern Anglo-American legal tradition. There
were struggles between competing traditions and customs (Norman
vs. English; secular vs. ecclesiastical; centralized vs. local), the
118. United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (D. Utah 2005) (imposing a
188 month sentence in light of Booker when the Guidelines would have imposed a
sentence of no less than 188 months).
119. None of the principles in this Article apply exclusively to federal judicial
discretion. In fact, a state like Washington, faced with a now-invalid determinate sen
tencing scheme, would do well to heed the historical foundation of judicial discretion.
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emergence of a professional judicial core, and there was an explo
sion in the volume of litigation. 120 The inherent tensions in these
evolutionary conflicts help to illustrate under what circumstances,
through what mechanisms, and why sovereigns have sought to limit
or expand judicial discretion.
To understand an English judge's role during this period, and
thereby truly grasp the level of primary or secondary discretion 121
he 122 mayor may not have had, it is probably best to sketch briefly
the development of the English legal system post-Norman Con
quest to 1215.123
A.

Overview of the Development of the Medieval English Legal
System: 1066-1215
1.

English Law

Regardless of where one starts one's examination of the En
glish legal system, it is impossible not to mention the influence of
the Norman Conquest. It has been said that the "[c]onquest is a
catastrophe which determines the whole future history of English
law."124 The Normans "brought a taste for strong government and
a flair for administration,"125 and it was this flair that eventually
enabled judges (or others) to rule on behalf of the king without him
being physically present.1 26 The Normans (King William specifi
cally), brought an aptitude for administration, but chose to leave
English law largely in place, with some structural revisions, rather
than impose what remained of Norman laws. 127 With important ad
120. See infra Part II.A.
121. I will continue to use the same general definitions of primary and secondary
discretion discussed above, although discretionary limits are more explicitly discussed
later in the text. See infra Part II.B.
122. If I use a personal pronoun when referring to judges in Part II, I will use
"he" because judges in medieval Europe were male.
123. There are whole books written on English history and English law during
this period. I will limit my discussion to this period's relevant highlights for understand
ing the development or changes in judicial discretion.
124. 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HIS
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW 79 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1968) (1895).
125. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 6 (But
terworths Lexis Nexis 2002) (1971). But see R.c. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE
ENGLISH COMMON LAW 28 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1973) (noting that the transi
tion was not solely genius, but a large degree of luck as well).
126. BAKER, supra note 125, at 12.
127. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 79 (the decision not to impose
Norman law on the English may ultimately have saved English law from being swal
lowed by the Roman legal renaissance that was just around the comer). See also MAR
TIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 60 (1981).
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ministrative contributions came increased judicial efficiency.128 The
royal courts became a court of justice for all, so it became necessary
to alter the structure of the courts by simultaneously centralizing
and specializing them. 129
It is not entirely obvious what exactly constituted the "law of
England" in the years immediately following the Conquest. For
one thing, the laws and administration of justice in England en
dured several encounters with competing legal systems during the
late eleventh and early twelfth centuries.130
Further, the Normans did not bring a code with them, for there
was no written Norman code.13 1 Even an early book credited as
being the laws of King William granted to the English is merely a
hodgepodge of different legal systems. The Leis Williame is part
Norman-interpretive understanding of old English law, part transla
tion of parts of Cnut's code, all with a sprinkling of "articles which
betray the influence of Roman law."132 In the end, a person might
draw on the old English dooms, the Lex Salica (canonical law), or
the re-emerging Roman law.133 Add to this French-speaking nobil
ity trying to rule an English population used to Wessex law, Mer
cian Law, or Danelaw, and it made for quite a confusing state of
affairs. From a legal-consistency perspective, "the country was be
coming covered with small courts" with one rising over another fur
ther fractionalizing legal customs.134 It was a constant challenge to
figure out which court had jurisdiction over what causes of actions.
2.

The King's Central Courts

From the chaos emerged the future of English law as we now
know it, and as Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederic William
128. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 153.
129. Id. at 153. See also VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 125, at 19.
130. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 80-87. One of the conflicts was
for linguistic supremacy, with French emerging as the main victor. French is the "main
victor" for a couple of reasons. First, there were very few Frenchmen actually in En
gland after the Norman Conquest, so the fact that it gained a foothold within the law is
no small feat. Second, law to this day is stamped with French words, such as tort and
others. As Pollock and Maitland point out, the English that French eventually yielded
to was "an English in which every cardinal word was of French origin." Id. at 85. The
linguistic battle was important because "language is no mere instrument which we can
control at will; it controls us." Id. at 87.
131. Id. at 79.
132. Id. at 102. It is also likely the volume was not published until well after
William's death.
133. Id. at 105.
134. Id. at 106.
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Maitland note, it was the king's court.1 35 At the time, the king's
court was a flexible, equity court that met hardly three times a year,
yet was centralized, with "the king's justice ... done under his own
eye. "136 In that respect, it is important to remember that the
"judges were not set so clearly apart from the executive as in mod
ern times. "137
The central court of the king's justice (capitalis curia Regis)
was comprised of sworn, permanent justices who served the king
and were experts in the administration of justice.138 When the king
was absent, certain cases or complaints would be heard by another
group of judges of the royal court who sat at Westminster.1 39 Dur
ing the Westminster sessions, the king would often be absent, and
so these sessions also became quite popular. In fact, when the bar
ons "extorted"140 the Magna Carta from King John, one of the pro
visions they demanded provided for a permanent court of common
pleas at Westminster, so cases could be heard out of earshot of the
king.141 With this development the "personal justice of the king
[became] the institutional justice of the king's court. "142
The king had significant control over judges in his courts. In
1203, the king directed judges to act merely as "arbitrators" and to
"make peace between the parties."143 On other occasions the court
might feel a matter was beyond its competence. 144 Since the king
was seen as the wellspring of law, difficult points were sometimes
referred to the judgment of the king.1 45 This combination of judi
cial deference and kingly decrees limited judges' primary discretion.
Although substantial, the king's control over the justices was
not absolute. During the king's absence, the justices would often
dispense judgments in his name. Normally, the king might demand
that he be present for the hearing of certain cases. For example, in
1201, the king found a matter so important as to demand that its
135. Id. at 107. The two courts closely associated with the central king's courts
were the "King's Court" and the "Common Court."
136. Id. at 107-09.
137. SIR CYRIL FLOWER, INTRODUCTION TO TIiE CURIA REGIS ROLLS, 1199-1230
A.D. 15 (Selden Society 1944).
138. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 154-55.
139. SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 74.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 75.
FLOWER, supra note 137, at 15.

Id.
Id.
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resolution be postponed until his return to England. 146 Despite
such instructions, the king's demands were not always obeyed. On
several occasions in 1205 and 1206, the Curia Regis Rolls reveal that
the king's court proceeded on its own, despite assizes mandating
that a case should be delayed or postponed. 147 Even so, the in
stances where the king's judges exhibited independence from de
crees were few in comparison to acts of obedience. 148
3.

Other Royal Courts

An elaborate system of royal courts developed in the two hun
dred years following the Conquest. These courts operated "be
neath" the central King's Court, but were, nevertheless, vital for the
administration of justice in England and ultimately responsible to
the king. In addition to the King's Court and Common Court, there
were four other "central" courts: The Exchequer (dealt primarily
with money issues); Courts of the Forest (dealt with the king's for
ests); Courts of the Jews (dealt with money-lending issues); and the
Courts of the Palace (handled cases arising on the grounds of the
king's palace at Westminster).149 Each of these courts had special
ized jurisdiction over a geographical area or subject matter. These
specialized courts allowed the king to solidify his grasp on an area
of law, while not necessarily running it through the two main royal
courts.
For the widespread administration of the king's justice, how
ever, one court played a very important role. The Court of the Jus
tices in Eyre was the roaming court that served as the link between
central and local jurisdictions. 15o Henry I was the first to take full
advantage of these justices by seating a more permanent tribunal
made up of trusted barons and clerks who were occasionally sent
out into "the counties to hear the pleas of the crown."151 "Instead
of long-term delegation of royal authority to a lord permanently
connected to a single territory, there would be a temporary delega
tion to a king's officer," who occasionally traveled out on his
"eyre," where upon returning his authority was surrendered back to
146.
of land or
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 33. Often the "matter of importance" involved either important tracts
individuals closely associated with the king.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 43-53.
Id. at 53.
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 109.
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the king.152 The use of the eyre was at once an "administrative so
lution to an administrative problem,"153 while at the same time it
limited the power and discretion of local judges.t 54
The rise of the courts of eyre was, in part, a response to the
problem that the local courts continued to splinter because "[a]s the
barons became more powerful, they tended to garner the position
of sheriff in their locale for themselves or their friends."155 The
sheriffs then ceased transmitting royal power into the country
side. 156 Justice in the County Court may have been quicker than
other royal courts, but hardly anyone would contend that it was
impartial. 157 The problem of impartiality became less of an issue as
royal control was centralized. In fact, some enquiries were dele
gated from the central courts at Westminster to the local sheriffs. 158
Local courts and customs were not the king's only competition.
Ecclesiastical courts with their canonical law, as well as the re
emerging Roman law, played important roles in the early adminis
tration of justice.t 59 Canonical law eventually became the compet
ing legal system to English secular law, while Roman law acted
more as an influencing agent. Canonical law claimed jurisdiction
over certain ecclesiastical issues (and some marginally so) with the
rest largely left to the secular law of laymen. 160
Eventually, English secular law won out. At first, English
courts took bits and pieces from canon law, but in the end the
"king's justices ... [became] interested in the maintenance of a sys
tem that is all their own."161 The justices' system would be dictated
from within, not from abroad. 162 The church too was trying to limit
the jurisdiction of its clerics/judges by later forbidding them to sit
over secular matters or render judgments in secular cases. 163 The
king and the church were simultaneously struggling to bring their
respective judges under their exclusive control.
Finally, there remained private courts and other local courts,
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

SHAPIRO,

supra note 127, at 72.

Id. at 73.
V AN CAENEGEM, supra note 125, at 13.
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supra note 127, at 71.

Id.
FLOWER,

supra note 137, at 61.

Id. at 70.
POLLOCK

&

MAITLAND,

supra note 124, at 111.

Id. at 124-30.
Id. at 135.
See id. at 135.
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although both slowly lost importance as time passed from the Con
quest. Private courts would handle claims made between two indi
viduals that had the same lord. 164 The Hundred Court and other
local courts would handle local matters, but if significant land was
at stake, often at least one of the participants would seek the impar
tiality of the royal courtS.165
4.

The Development of the Law

Even though the Normans did not bring with them an estab
lished legal code and adopted a mix-match of legal traditions in En
gland, a more centralized form of law was needed for effective rule.
This was accomplished through specific decrees by the king, as well
as the continued centralization of the courts.
Under Henry II, the first large steps were taken towards estab
lishing early notions of a uniform common law. 166 In the late
twelfth century, Henry held a council at Clarendon where he forced
his nobles to clarify the law of the land where there was conflict
between canon and secular law. 167 Henry also tightened the admin
istration of justice by speaking with his justices about procedures or
the state of laws. 168
These changes, along with the Assize of Clarendon,169 (which
significantly changed the administration of criminal law), an investi
gation into the practices of sheriffs in 1170, and the Assize of North
ampton in 1176 (a new set of instructions to his justices), all
combined to strengthen the central control of justice, and its jus
tices, by the crown.17° As was well put by Pollock and Maitland:
If we try to sum up in a few words those results of Henry's reign

which are to be the most durable and the most fruitful, we may
say that the whole of English law is centralized and unified by the
institution of a permanent court of professional judges, by the
FLOWER, supra note 137, at 92.
[d. at 83.
166. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 136-37. One important point
about "common law" is that it was not at this point just judge-made law (as we com
monly use the term today), but rather was a way to distinguish secular law from canoni
cal law, or royal law from local. It was a term used to differentiate between types/
categories of law. Eventually, judge-made vs. statutory became another one of the dis
tinctions, and the one that holds true to this day. See supra Part LB. See also VAN
CAENEGEM, supra note 125, at 3.
167. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 137.
168. [d. at 136.
169. [d. at 137.
170. See id. at 137-38. See also VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 125, at 18.
164.

165.
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frequent mission of itinerant justices throughout the land, by the
introduction of the 'inquest' or 'recognition' and the 'original
writ' as normal parts of the machinery of justice.1 71

As previously discussed, it is significant that each and every
one of these "normal parts" operates as a limitation on judicial dis
cretion. The limitations serve other important functions besides re
straining the judiciary.l72
Henry II's. reforms widened the reach of monarchical power
and stripped many private parties of their traditional remedies,
both in civil and criminal matters.n3 The king's judges and officers
also took more control over the prosecution of serious crime 174 as
the list of criminal matters under the king's control grew. 175
During this period the first of the great English law books was
published: A Treatise on the Laws and Customs of England com
posed in the time of King Henry the Second while the honourable . ..
Ranulf Glanvill held the helm ofjustice. 176 Although it is not clear if
Glanvill actually wrote the book, it nevertheless became quite pop
ular.n 7 Glanvill's book acted as a reference for judges, although
not in the precedential sense. 178 Precedent and case law would
emerge relatively soon though. 179
At Henry's passing,
the strong central court was doing justice term after term on a
large scale [and would continue to do so through the reign of
King Richard]; it was beginning to have a written memory which
would endure for all ages in the form of a magnificent series of
judicial records. 180
171. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 38.
172. See supra notes 135-66 and accompanying text.
173. THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICf ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES
ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200-1800, at 9 (1985).
174. Sir Frederick Pollock, The King's Peace in the Middle Ages, 13 HARV. L.
REV. 177, 178 (1900).
175. Id. at 177-78. This does not mean that the local role ceased. In one example
from the Curia Regis rolls of the Justice in Eyre, the sheriff seems to have been the one
to determine the outcome of a criminal accused of the rape and robbery of a woman.
FLOWER, supra note 137, at 57.
176. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 163-64.
177. Id. at 163, 166.
178. Id. at 166.
179. The book that would act more as a reporter of cases for precedential use was
Bracton's great law book, compiled between 1250-1258. Unlike Glanvill before him,
Bracton drew on precedent and provided an accurate and uniform view of English law.
Id. at 206-07.
180. Id. at 168-69.
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The English legal system continued to evolve at a quickening
pace from the thirteenth century on (and beyond the scope of this
Article). The largest development that bears mentioning for the
purpose of this Article is the Magna Carta.l 81 It was demanded by
the barons, granted by the King, and served as the most significant
check on the king's justice to that point. 182 The king too closely
controlled the royal courts183 and judicial discretion was limited to
such an extent that the barons demanded changes.l 84 One signifi
cant outcome of the Magna Carta was to place the king "below the
law."185 The Magna Carta was the first great statute of England
and it wrestled away some of the king's control over judges and the
law. From that point on, judicial discretion would continue to ex
pand in England and later, some of the Magna Carta's central
discretionary principals would be embodied III the U.S.
Constitution. 186

B. Judicial Discretion in Medieval England between 1066 and
1215
Closely associated with the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition is the
concept of judicial independence. Today, we might conceptualize
this as freedom from constraint, or the opportunity to exercise dis
cretion. Yet, early medieval English judges were not independent
in the way we now think of "independence."187 Between 1066 and
1215, justices were never truly "independent. "188 The king was
above everyone else (at least until the Magna Carta), and the
181. A copy of the Magna Carta translation is available through the U.S. National
Archives and Record Administration at http;!lwww.archives.gov/exhibiChalVfea
tured_documents/magna_cartaltranslation.html.
182. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 181.
183. Id. at 204 Uudges on the King's Bench are "very truly the king's servants");
see also HARDING, supra note 163, at 38 ("scope of royal justice depended ... on the
king's power").
184. Daniel Brook, Happy 789th, Magna Carta, LEGAL AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at
10.
185. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 181-82.
186. Brook, supra note 184, at 10.
187. SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 66. At first blush this will limit the conclusions
that might be drawn from a comparison between the current federal judiCial system and
medieval England's. However, as will be discussed below, this does not operate as a
significant barrier.
188. See id. at 66-67. But see United States v. Ranum, No. 04-CR-31, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1338 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 19, 2005) (imposing a twelve month, one day sentence
where the Guidelines would have required a sentence range of thirty-seven to forty-siX
months).
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judges were clearly his subjects.1 89
Martin Shapiro suggests that "most of the phenomena we
come to call judicial independence, or see as the roots of judicial
independence, are closely associated historically with a long-term
English tendency toward extreme political centralization."19o The
courts' "powers and jurisdiction, indeed their very existence, have
been determined by the king's commission and/or parliamentary
statute. "191 Even so, just prior to the Norman Conquest, English
judges did occasionally exercise discretion when it came to impos
ing penalties.1 92 After the Conquest, however, the Norman kings
would understandably be involved in the administration of justice
as a tool for ruling a foreign land. 193
There were four main structural mechanisms that acted to limit
judicial discretion in medieval England between 1066 and 1215: (1)
the centralization of the courts and the accompanying uniformity in
the law; (2) the advent of the jury; (3) "appellate" review; and (4)
jurisdictional limitations, including the specialization of courts.1 94
As with the discussion of the U.S. legal system, this list is not ex
haustive, but covers the primary structural limitations on judicial
discretion. Additionally, there were spot-measures and specific de
crees by the king that acted to limit discretion, such as the Assize
discussed above.1 95
1.

Centralization of Courts and Uniformity in the Law

As the Norman kings consolidated the numerous English
courts into a smaller number of royal courts,196 two things further
acted to limit judicial discretion. First, centralizing courts allowed
for the transmission of the king's power through "tentacles running
into the countryside."197 This allowed for more control by the king
over the actual decisions. This was especially so for kings like King
John, who was absent from England far less frequently than some
189. [d. See also VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 125, at 23 (describing the back
ground and training of Henry II's justices).
190. SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 66.
191. Id.
192. NAOMI D. HURNARD, THE KING'S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE: BEFORE A.D.
1307, at 2 (1969).
193. See RALPH V. TURNER, THE KING AND HIS COURTS: THE ROLE OF JOHN
AND HENRY III IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 1199-1240, at 11 (1968).
194. See supra notes 135-66 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
196. See discussion infra Parts II.A.2, II.A.3.
197. SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 78.
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of the early Norman kings.1 98 The king's actual physical presence
allowed for far more control over the outcome of individual cases.
The king also maintained "his freedom to draw those cases that in
terested him or involved him in some indirect way into his own
court, where he could watch over them more closely."199
Second, as litigants discovered that the king's justice was not
only more efficient, but also supposedly less biased, many litigants
began to pursue their cases in royal courts. This had the effect of
limiting the number of cases under local control. Thus, the centrali
zation allowed the king more control over his own judges' decisions
while simultaneously structurally limiting the primary discretion of
local judges by removing more and more types of claims or actions
from their courts and into the hands of the king.
The king's "tentacles" were the itinerant justices, who along
with the central royal court sitting at Westminster, played an impor
tant role in the centralization of power. 200 Itinerant justices trav
eled out into the countryside on temporary assignments to hear
cases in the king's name.2 01 While centralizing power in the king,
the act of bringing the itinerant justices back into the king's pres
ence functioned to limit those justices' ability to exert any kind of
independence or discretion-provided they wanted to remain on
the king's good side. Henry II can be credited for refining the role
of the itinerant justices by sending them out on regularly scheduled
circuits, so locals would be able to count on when the king's law
would come to town. 202 Regularity allowed for further reliance by
litigants.
Another by-product of sending the itinerant justices was the
diffusion of a more uniform body of English law. 203 Rather than
having a different legal custom in each village that only a well
versed local judge might be able to decipher, slowly there emerged
increased consistency and overall uniformity.204 However, the itin
erant justices did not have unfettered discretion to impose the
king's laws as they saw fit. In 1178, the King returned to England
and heard complaints about itinerant justices enforcing the Assize
198.
199.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

supra note 193, at 21.
[d. at 35.
[d. at 10-11.
HARDING, supra note 163, at 32-38;
TURNER, supra note 193, at 11-14.
HARDING, supra note 163, at 38.
TURNER,
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of Northampton with too much "zeal."205 The justices in question
were removed and although itinerant justices were sent out again
the following year, the message was clear: you [itinerant justice]
are allowed some freedom, but never forget you are the king's
servant. 206
The king's displeasure at over-enforcement of his decrees
should be contrasted with the discretion that remained inherent in
the system when it came to lessening sentences. For many crimes,
justices retained the discretion to lessen the penalties or "impose a
pecuniary penalty in lieu of more severe punishment.''207 Justices'
exercise of discretion, when it came to lessening penalties, was de
signed to have a specific effect. By allowing judges to lessen some
penalties based on the facts of the case, the aim "was the mainte
nance of good law and good order, and in relying on discretionary
powers to avoid undue rigidity in his new rules, Henry II was fol
lowing the traditional policy of Saxon and Danish kings.''208 This
increased the likelihood that the Norman kings' decrees and laws
would be followed and respected.
Some very serious crimes, such as felonious homicide, would
be removed to the sole province of the king, but in many cases the
"king's justices, whether in the Curia Regis or on eyre, had author
ity to license concords in appeals of breach of [the king's] peace."209
Licenses for concords were like pardons, except that they were is
sued when it looked likely that a party would prosecute an "appeal"
to the case. 210
Homicide, the ultimate breach of the king's peace, understand
ably became a subject matter the king took great interest in. Early
after the Norman Conquest, some killings were considered local in
nature and would not have been under the king's justice,211 but that
distinction did not last long. In the Assize of Clarendon in 1166, for
example, no distinction was made between killings that did not in
voke the king's peace and those that did. 212 Later, this would result
in quite odd resolutions.
For example, in 1203 a man killed five people in a "fit of mad
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

V AN
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ness."213 Then, in an obvious case of self-defense, an individual de
termined not to become the sixth victim killed the madman. 214
Normally, the justices would have handled this case (i.e., dis
missed), but they were required to refer it to the King.215 Hurnard
suggests that the king's screening of homicide cases was in part due
to a lack of trust in the justices. 216
By the late twelfth century, a person charged with homicide
would have to appeal to the king for mercy?17 but there is signifi
cant evidence that pardons were available for the right amount. 218
In any event, by allowing for the possibility of a pardon, the king
was able to give more severe penalties.219 The logic was that the
constant imposition of stiff penalties without some opportunity for
clemency would result in unrest. Over the long-term, this would
make it harder for the Normans to rule effectively.
A more uniform body of law and the development of the
"common law" also necessarily meant a move away from the mix
ing of secular and canonical law, as each was becoming increasingly
uncomfortable with the church's role in secular law. 220
As previously discussed, the actual rendering of laws into writ
ing was another important factor in creating uniform English laws.
The law books of Granvill and Bracton, while not constituting bind
ing precedent, created a model of legal and judicial thinking. Along
with new English law books came the increased use and writing of
pleas and rolls. On the one hand, these developments were liberat
ing for judges. As the common law developed, it became the prov
ince of those schooled in it to improve it. On the other hand, a
written record of an increasingly centralized and uniform law struc
turally reduced the number of choices from which a judge had to
choose. No longer could a judge pick from canonical law to reach a
result; no longer, as the common law gained stronger roots, could a
judge make a decision "willy-nilly." The law books provided a stan
dard against which judicial decisions-the exercise of discretion
were measured.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
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The Jury

Although the development of the modern jury was still years
away in the eleventh, twelfth, and early thirteenth centuries, its
close cousin was emerging. From the Assize of Clarendon came the
first significant change in the composition and role of the jury in
England. 221 The jury was, and would develop further into, a body
by which primary judicial discretion would be limited. Like juries
of today, these juries were concerned with factual matters, which
reduced judicial discretion. This reduction of judicial discretion was
not by accident, as evidenced by the conflict between secular and
canonical law. Juries were used where there was some disagree
ment between the two: "Church and state are at issue, and neither
should be judge in its own cause."222
The first jury to hear a case and decide the factual issues did
not always have the last word, however. The jury of attaint was a
powerful tool by which the court could reexamine the evidence or
facts of the case. "Under the theory that the trial jury may have
'willfully falsified' their verdict, an attaint jury was summoned to
decide whether the first jury had perjured themselves."223 If the
second jury decided that the first jury had perjured itself, the judge
would impose stiff penalties on the attainted jury, such as forfeiture
of their goods and chattels, loss of their lands to the king, ejectment
of their wives and children from their homes, and payment of a
fine. 224 Additionally, since the original party to the case was a party
along with the suspect jury, the original party also had to pay a
firie. 225
Just the threat of an attaint meant the judge wielded a signifi
cant amount of power in shaping the outcome of a case. While the
writ of attaint was originally only granted by leave of the king, its
use was later given to the discretion of the judges. 226 As one com
mentator has noted: "Fortunately, the doctrine of jury attaint is no
longer around for judges to use to bludgeon jurors into being other
SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 77-78.
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 144-45.
Renee B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in
Early Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 505, 509-10 (1995) (quot
ing JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
137 (1898».
224. Id. at 510; David Millon, Positivism in the Historiography of the Common
Law, 1989 WIS. L. REv. 669, 686-87 (1989).
225. Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 29, 37
n.44 (1994).
226. Id.
221.
222.
223.
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than independent and impartial finders of fact."227 Even though
juries could be attainted, the role of the jury was nevertheless struc
turally designed to limit primary judicial discretion.
3.

Appellate Review

Appellate review did not exist for medieval judges the way we
conceive of it today. An "appeal" in medieval England was actually
a charge against the judge, personally, for the decision reached in a
case. There was no right to appeal and no formalized structure.
Only in certain circumstances did appealing act as a mechanism for
righting "miscarriages of justice."228 Even though the parties did
not always have the opportunity to appeal, some county courts
would seek advice from the royal court in Westminster if the county
court had a particularly difficult case. 229
Given that appeal was neither a uniformly available nor a
widely used procedure, it is better to think of those appeals that did
occur as ad hoc limits on discretion, as opposed to structural limits
on secondary discretion. Therefore, appeals hardly constituted the
same kind of mechanism that would in turn affect judicial decision
making in the way we now think of them. 230 Nevertheless, appel
late review as it existed in medieval England still remained a pri
mary and secondary discretion-limiting mechanism.
4.

Jurisdiction as a Limitation on Discretion

Jurisdiction was then, as it is now, a significant limitation on
judicial discretion. In some cases the limitation was structural. As
the court system was centralized, the king was able to divide up the
work to different types of courts. In addition to the king's courts,
including the itinerant justices, there were courts like the "justices
of the Jews," which were concerned solely with the issues arising
out of the Jewish money-lending industry.231 As Ralph Turner
227. Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal Judges to Marshall &
Comment on the Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118
F.R.D. 161, 165-66 (1988).
228. HARDING, supra note 163, at 38-39.
229. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 124, at 185.
230. See, e.g., Hon. Ann Claire Williams, Speech at University of Wisconsin Law
School (Feb. 23, 2004) (notes of speech on file with author). Speaking about her fifteen
years as a district court judge in Chicago, Illinois, Judge Williams mentioned that when
deciding a close case, she had an eye on whether the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
would likely reverse her decision. If reversal was likely, it affected her decision-making.
Id.
231. TURNER, supra note 193, at 41.
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notes, judges also knew there were limits on which matters they
should be deciding and which ones were best left to the king. 232
This type of behavior, while not necessarily imposed by the king,
acted as a limitation on those judges' discretion to handle certain
types of cases, or make certain types of rulings.
Some of the jurisdictional limitations were not structural, but
rather operated on an individual basis. Itinerant justices, for exam
ple, could be given very limited-purpose appointments. 233 Purpose
based limitations acted in concert with structural limitations to sig
nificantly restrict judicial discretion. The king could maintain strict
control over the behavior of the justices by expanding or limiting
the justices' jurisdiction on an individual basis.

III.

TRANSFERABLE CONCEPTS AND LESSONS

In comparing federal judicial discretion in twenty-first century
America with medieval England, we see that many of the mecha
nisms that now operate to limit primary and secondary judicial dis
cretion have their roots in the tumultuous period immediately
following the Norman Conquest. Further, both Congress and kings
took specific actions with the goal of limiting judicial discretion in
reaction to events of the day. Often, these specific reactions have
been attempts to legitimize the sovereign's authority to rule.
Congress' reaction to the continuous challenges to the Sentenc
ing Guidelines as manifested by the systemic downward departures,
was to enact the Feeney Amendment. In Congress' eyes, down
ward departures were an affront to the crime-sanctioning power of
Congress, and therefore of the United States. Instead of looking to
address the underlying issues (i.e., possibly faulty guidelines), Con
gress sought to alter the level of judicial discretion to resolve the
turmoiL Similarly, Congress reacted in a "knee-jerk" fashion when
it changed the sentences for white-collar crimes, even though the
committee tasked with recommending sentences did not think
longer sentences were necessary.
Congress limited federal judges' primary and secondary discre
tion through specific enactments-not unlike the kings' Assizes
and further sought to influence judicial behavior by strengthening
its physical presence (the subpoena mechanism). This practice is
not unlike the tactic of King John who, in his quest to centralize
power, kept his royal court under close scrutiny out of fear and
232.
233.

Id. at 39.
Id. at 30.
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suspicion. 234
In looking at the period following the Norman Conquest, we
see the beginnings of structural limitations being put in place as
kings experimented with maintaining centralized control over gov
ernment and the administration of justice. For many of the same
reasons, those structural limitations persist in the U.S. legal system.
Four main structural limitations originating in medieval En
gland between 1066 and 1215 survive. First, following the Assize of
Clarendon, the jury began to limit the scope of judicial fact-finding.
As a discretion-limiting mechanism, the jury persists today, al
though admittedly in twenty-first century America this function of
the jury is becoming increasingly less relevant.
Second, the Norman Kings put significant jurisdictionallimita
tions on early judges as a way of controlling them. Congress contin
ues to impose significant jurisdictional limitations (subject matter
and personal) on federal court judges, thereby restricting their pri
mary discretion.
Third, the concerted effort to move from local justice and cus
tom to a centralized court system with a "common law" and the
moving away from canonical law as a way of solidifying royal power
and justice, resulted in centralized courts. In twenty-first century
America, the federal trial courts are centralized under one Supreme
Court and twelve courts of appeals. Via appellate review and stat
utes, Congress continues to create a uniform body of law for those
courts to apply in concert at the will of Congress.
Finally, although modern notions of appellate review were spo
radic in medieval England, appellate review has become one of the
defining features of the American legal system. It now operates as
a structural mechanism to limit secondary discretion.
These structural limitations were established as a way of re
straining the judiciary and cementing the strength and legitimacy of
the king. Spot measures used by the king, and now Congress, (e.g.,
Assizes or the Feeney Amendment) reduce primary judicial discre
tion. Even though U.S. federal judges have some protections
against a complete scuttling of their discretion, spot measures and
structural limitations act together to perform many of the same dis
cretion-limiting functions as they did eight to ten centuries ago.
While a measure of discretion has been restored as a result of
234.

Id. at 43-44.
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Blakely and Booker, Congress is sure to react to limit discretion
once again.
The most important lesson for Congress looking forward may
be a cautionary one, and it is hard to improve on a popular quote:
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat
it."235 At the very least, "[t]hose who do not remember [the past]
are in jeopardy of suffering at the hands of those who say they
do."236 The U.S. Constitution sets up a unique structure that is de
signed to ensure judicial independence. Despite the Founders' de
sire to establish an independent judiciary, many of the same
structural limitations on judicial discretion that existed in medieval
England remain present in the U.S. federal system.
The increasing number of discretion-limiting statutory enact
ments, such as Congress' limitations in the realm of sentencing,
make our current federal judges' discretion look more and more
like the discretion wielded by medieval English judges. That will
again likely be true when Congress reacts to Booker. The examina
tion by subpoena of individual judges' sentencing decisions is not
unlike the king bringing an itinerant justice back to Westminster to
review the justice's actions on eyre. Likewise, when the king dis
missed itinerant justices for over-enforcing his laws, he sent a strong
message. Will Congress do the same by impeaching a judge who
continues to downward-depart in the face of the Feeney
Amendment?
It is important to understand the historical reasons for judicial
discretion-or the lack of it-before we start chipping away at what
discretion U.S. federal district court judges still have, both before,
and now after, Booker. The more judicial discretion is removed,
the more judges will become Congress' servants.
Before any steps are taken to replace or modify the Guide
lines, thereby again restricting judges' sentencing discretion, it
would be wise to understand why judges need discretion as they
perform their valuable role in our society. Rushing to replace or
modify the Guidelines without appreciating the possible conse..,
quences will likely lead to disastrous results.
Judges in medieval England were in many respects merely the
235. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON OR PHASES OF HUMAN PRO
GRESS 284 (New York 1920),
236, Herbert Butterfield, The Dangers of History, reprinted in THE VITAL PAST:
WRITINGS ON THE USES OF HISTORY 1, 11 (S. Vaughn ed" 1985); see also Maxwell,
supra note 59, at B2 (Tom Feeney saying about himself: "I am here to say that 1 think
Tom Feeney knows more about the Constitution than some of our federal judges,"),
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servants of the king, but even the Norman kings understood that
unbending enforcement of stiff penalties was counter-productive on
a number of fronts. Long-term enforcement without some opportu
nity for clemency results in unrest. The possibility of a pardon gave
the king the freedom to impose stiffer penalties and judges could
attaint juries they thought had misapplied the facts. Congress
seems to have forgotten these lessons.
By taking action that further limits judicial discretion, Con
gress runs the risk that modern judges will have little more discre
tion than medieval English judges had. Given our Founders' desire
to separate themselves from England when the Constitution was
written, and by providing three separate branches of government, it
is unlikely they wished Congress to reestablish severe limits on judi
cial discretion. Whether mandatory federal sentencing schemes are
reincarnated or not, we should continue to question the wisdom of
further limiting judicial discretion.
CONCLUSION

The Norman kings both used structural mechanisms and spe
cific measures to limit both the primary and secondary discretion of
judges. Many of the mechanisms that now operate to limit federal
judges' discretion have their roots in post-Conquest England be
tween 1066 and 1215. Specifically, the creation of uniform laws
vested in one system of courts, the jury, the appellate process, and
jurisdiction, all operated then, as they do now, to limit judicial
discretion.
We should question the wisdom of recent and future congres
sional attempts to limit the sentencing discretion of federal judges,
as the more judges are reined in by Congress, the more they resem
ble the king's justices. More importantly, we should be concerned
with a continued erosion of judicial discretion without understand
ing its historical underpinnings. The king's justices had very limited
discretion and were largely beholden to the king; it is difficult to
imagine the Founders envisioning a similarly servile role for U.S.
federal judges.

